Agreement On Peace And Reconciliation In Mali
Malian stakeholders and the international community should conclude the agreement, take stock of what has gone wrong, call for the development of an integration process and the requirement for accountability to achieve realistic goals. The overhaul of the peace process in Mali is simply an awareness that the conflict has overtaken the agreement. If stakeholders do not accept that it is time to adopt a new approach, it will cost the people of Mali, the region and Mali`s foreign partners in Europe and the United States. The agreement aims to restore peace in Mali, including through a process of decentralization or regionalization, by re-establishing a national army made up of members of former armed groups and by stimulating the economy (particularly in the North) on the basis of dialogue, justice and national reconciliation. The first joint government patrol and coordination platform was launched on 23 February in Gao (composed of 600 members of the Malian army, coordination and platform and 150 other armed groups protesting its exclusion). An agreement was reached on the composition of the interim authorities in the five regions of northern Mali, installed on 28 February in Kidal (but without representatives of the platform), Gao and Menaka on 2 March and In Timbuktu and Taoudenni on 20 April. In addition, the National Agreement conference was held from 27 March to 2 April and was more successful than expected, and the armed groups and opposition parties, which initially announced their boycott, finally joined us. In this context, the G5 counter-terrorism force in the Sahel should aim to support rather than replace a difficult political process. Minusma, which remains the only member of the international mediation team to have a significant presence in northern Mali, is expected to continue to play a strong political role, both nationally and locally. In the absence of alternatives, the best wall against terrorism and the return to violence remains the implementation of the peace agreement and the return of a more legitimate state presence in northern Mali. So far, women`s participation in the peace process has been negligible, but it is now on the rise. Prime Minister Maaga`s government now has 11 women, in line with the objective of Malian legislation.
In addition, women have been appointed to interim agencies and, with the help of MINUSMA, more women will be involved in the monitoring committee of the agreement. First, this idea gives the illusion that the signatory armed groups are capable of acting against the jihadists. Many members of these signatory groups have been killed in suicide bombings and other jihadist attacks; they are often forced to negotiate unofficial non-aggression pacts with militant groups. In addition, Barkhane`s “anti-terrorist” alliance with two platform-owned armed groups in the Liptako-Gourma region between 2017 and 2019 has proved unable to curb the jihadists` expansion. Worse still, it has exacerbated the situation by exacerbating tensions between local societies (see the latest report of the crisis group on Niger). Armed groups see no benefit in weakening their position in the fight against the jihadists, while the Malian state continues to raise the spectre of the revision of the peace agreement. In addition, most armed groups in the North have fighters in their ranks who, prior to the French intervention, were former members of jihadist groups or have family or tribal ties to jihadist elements. This led to discussions on the appointment of an independent observer by the monitoring committee to objectively assess the progress of implementation in accordance with Article 63 of the peace agreement. While it is difficult to imagine how such an observer could blame (or recommend sanctions, as some members of the Security Council seem to hope), its designation could prove to be a useful mechanism to replace the Monitoring Committee along the way.